

Y204 Institutional Analysis & Governance

Course No.: 33405 / TR 16:00p-17:15p @ TV226

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Course Description

This course introduces students to the conceptual analysis of institutions as a way to understand the dynamic operation of governance and policy networks. By acquiring the multidisciplinary tool-set that is institutional analysis, students will be able to examine sociopolitical and economic events and phenomena in a new light.

Governance as a concept is vague in definition, but for this class it *determines who can do what to whom, when, where, and in whose name*. That is to say governance is “the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and institutions” (Hufty, 2011).

Institutions, on the other hand are “are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange” (North, 1991)

That is to say, in this course we will not limit our analysis only to formal governments as it would not be appropriate. This, because virtually all substantive areas of public policy are dominated by an interrelated set of policy networks of public, private, and voluntary organizations. Even if these organizations individually seek their own interest, they collectively manage to work together in some areas and issues.

Institutional Analysis is a multidisciplinary tool-box of research methods and techniques, all of which are based on the assumption of rational choice as a key or fundamental component of human behavior. Institutions, as North (1991) mentioned, are established as mechanisms that facilitate interactions and lower transaction costs, maximizing the potential gains that can be taken from collective action, benefitting some actors, usually (but not always) at the expense of others. In this course we will examine the extent to which this type of analysis can be applied to all components of governance.

Course Requirements

Grades will be based on five major components. The contribution of these requirements to final course grades is as follows:

Attendance and Participation	10%
Perfect attendance extra credit	5%
Exams (two midterms)	35%
Six Quizzes	15%
Individual research project	40%
Research question & Hypotheses (due 9/21)	5%
Literature Review (due 10/5)	10%
Research design (due 10/26)	5%
Final paper draft (due 11/25)	Optional*
Final paper (due 12/8)	20%

Course Materials

Required course materials: All materials will be posted on Canvas, or are available through [OneSearch@IU](#). You will submit your assignments and quizzes on Canvas, so you will have to have access to a computer, a word processor such as Word or \LaTeX . Fortunately, the University has computers with these programs available at any Student Technology Center (computer labs, 'STC's), and access to online editing sites such as [ShareLatex](#).

Weekly Course Outline

Week	Date	Discussion Topic
I:	Fundamentals	
1	Aug/21	Syllabus, intro rational choice, institutions
2	Aug/28	Game & formal theory, process tracing, statistics
3	Sept/04	Transaction costs, time-consistency, agency problems
II:	Political Institutions	
4	Sept/11	Institutional coordination, complementarity & change
5	Sept/18	Constitutions, laws, and electoral systems part I
6	Sept/25	Constitutions, laws, and electoral systems part II
7	Oct/02	Partisanship, bureaucracies
8	Oct/09	Monetary and financial policy, veto players
9	Oct/16	Midterm I & Research Project advising
III:	Economic Institutions	
10	Oct/23	Property rights, public goods, tragedy of commons
11	Oct/30	Collective bargaining, contract enforcement
12	Nov/06	Inequality, economic cycles, international finance
13	Nov/13	Midterm II

IV: Whither we go?

14	Nov/20	Thanksgiving Break
15	Nov/27	Institutional change and evolution & Paper draft
16	Dec/4	Final thoughts & Research paper

Disability-Related and Special Accommodations

Please let us know at the start of the semester by September 4 at the latest whether you require special accommodations. Note that the Disability Services for Students (DSS) Office requires that you take proactive actions to devise a plan at the start of the semester that meets your needs. If you are not already registered with DSS, and think that you may need their assistance, please see the [DSS website](#) for more information and to talk to an advisor if you need guidance formulating your plan. The Y205 staff is available to help you complete this course successfully. Please make it a point to seek assistance as soon as you experience any problems. But if your enrollment and/or performance in class is affected by extra-curricular circumstances, we ask that you first contact the [Student Advocates Office \(SAO\)](#) at 855-0761 to explain your situation. SAO staff can help you assess your options and contact instructors on your behalf in order to protect your privacy. Please note that any petitions for special accommodations will only be considered if they are consistent with University regulations; yet another reason to work with SAO directly.

Grading specifics

The components upon which you will be graded in this course are described as follows:

Attendance and participation – 10% & 5% E.C.

Since this course is primarily conceptual in focus, most sessions will be devoted to the presentation and discussion of analytical tools and concepts used in the study of governance and institutionalism, and examples of how these tools and concepts have been used drawing from research in comparative politics and international relations, usually with a political economy perspective. Students will be asked to apply these tools and skills to a specific area of particular interest to them in class, so daily attendance and active participation are imperative to successfully complete this course.

To get full credit, students must not only attend class, but also read all assigned materials before coming to class, and be ready to participate in class discussions and answer questions on the material. In general, you should plan on attending all class meetings and comply with all classroom policies described below in more detail.

Exceptions to required attendance include anticipated absences due to *religious observations* (please submit request form available from the Dean of Students by September 4 at the latest) or *personal and family emergencies*. In the case of emergencies, you must submit appropriate documentation to the instructor.

Other absences

I know college life gets complicated sometimes. That is why in addition to valid reasons for missing classes (doctor appointments, sickness, attending family events and emergencies, threats to your personal safety or security), you will be allowed up to two days of unexcused absences without it affecting your attendance and participation grade.

Perfect Attendance Extra Credit

Were a student not to miss out on more than what has been outlined heretofore (two unexcused absences, and excused absences that are properly documented), he/she shall receive a 5% extra credit to his/her final grade. However, were the student's absence to surpass these, the extra credit shall be forfeited, and further deductions would be exacted upon the student's grade.

Exams – 35%

There will be two midterm exams, preceded by a review session and a short study guide highlighting important topics that will come in the exam. However, the student is expected to review in general all materials provided to better prepare for the exams.

- **Midterm I** (October 18): This will be in-class examination on lecture topics from the first (introduction to concepts and tools) and second part (introduction to political institutions) of the course outline.
- **Midterm II** (November 15): This will be an in-class on lecture topics from the third part (introduction to economic institutions) of the course outline.

Six quizzes – 15%

The students will complete some six quizzes either online on Canvas or in the classroom to gauge their knowledge on how to apply the skills studied in class. These will examine students' abilities to interpret research articles' arguments, evidence, as well as basic concepts connected to the analysis of institutions, policy, and other relevant information for this course. To calculate the grade, the results of all six quizzes (expected to total 60 points) will be divided over five (50pts), thus allowing students to either skip one of the quizzes, or take a chance at improving their grade with the extra points to be garnered from this.

Quizzes will be announced at least one class before they take place (e.g. if the quiz is on a Thursday, you should have been notified on Tuesday; also, since we may have online quizzes, I can notify about a quiz on a Thursday that will be available until a Sunday).

Individual Research project – 40%

For many of you this will be the first experience writing a serious analytical or research article in political science. While it may appear daunting, the instructor will guide you through the steps and motions necessary for you to succeed in this endeavor.

Students will **write a 10- to 15-page research paper on a topic germane to the study of political science** with the concepts and tools acquired in class. First, students are encouraged to select a paper topic as soon as possible and **meet with the instructor by September 13, 2018 to discuss initial ideas**. The instructor will make several academic journal articles available through the canvas website that may serve as guiding examples for students to base their analyses and projects on. This research paper will be written in cumulative stages, which will receive feedback within a week of the part's submission, as follows:

- **Research question and hypotheses** (Due on Canvas on Friday 9/21 at midnight): This part requires that you identify a research topic and some three related research questions amenable for institutional analysis. It also will include an accompanying set of working hypotheses. *Suggested length: 1-2 pages.*
- **Literature review** (Due on Canvas on Friday 10/5 at midnight): For this part you will write a literature review of scholarly books and articles related to your research topic. This is not a summary of the books and articles you will use to frame your study. A literature review discusses published information in a particular subject area, and sometimes information in a particular subject area within a certain time period. It usually has an organizational pattern and combines both summary and synthesis. A summary is a recap of the important information of the source, but a synthesis is a re-organization, or a reshuffling, of that information. It might give a new interpretation of old material or combine new with old interpretations. Or it might trace the intellectual progression of the field, including major debates. And depending on the situation, the literature review may evaluate the sources and advise the reader on the most pertinent or relevant. For more information, [check this link](#). *Suggested length: 2-4 pages.*
- **Research design** (Due on Canvas on Friday 10/26 at midnight): This part of the proposal includes the identification of an appropriate research design to test your proposed hypotheses along with a timeline for project completion. *Suggested length: 2 pages.*
- **Paper Draft** (Due on Canvas on Sunday 11/25 at midnight): The paper draft will be ostensibly identical to the final paper. It will incorporate all parts the final paper is supposed to include. Its submission, however will be optional. While not graded, it will receive feedback which will give students an idea on how much (or little) they have to improve on the paper before the final submission. *Suggested length 10-15 pages.*
- **Final Paper:** The paper will be due on Sunday December 9 on Canvas. This should incorporate the following parts: Introduction, Literature Review, Research Design/Methodology, Discussion, and Conclusion. *Suggested length 10-15 pages.*

Classroom Policies

The following is not an exhaustive list of all applicable classroom policies. Beyond the stated policies below, this class will be governed by university regulations and expectations regard-

ing academic affairs and academic integrity. If you are not familiar with these requirements, please review the [Code of Student Rights, Responsibilities, and Conduct](#).

Final grade calculation

Please note that this course is not graded on a curve. Your course grade is entirely up to you depending on your overall performance.

At the end of the semester, the sum of your total number of regular plus any earned extra credit points will determine your final grade as follows (bold denotes a regular letter grade, without plus or minus):

	-	Regular	+
A range	89.5-92.4	92.5-96.4	96.5-100+
B range	79.5-82.4	82.5-86.4	86.5-89.4
C range	69.5-72.4	72.5-76.4	76.5-79.4
D range	59.5-62.4	62.5-66.4	66.5-69.4
F range		0-59.4	

For example, if your final cumulative score is 91, you will earn an A-. If you have a cumulative score of 95, you will earn an A. If you have a score of 97 or higher, you will get an A+. The same logic applies to lower grade ranges.

Late assignment policy

You can elect to take a two-day grace period on any TWO exercises AND ONE major assignment no questions asked. If, at the end of that period, you are still having trouble completing the assignment, you **MUST** meet with me in person to go over an outline of your ideas and set a schedule for getting the paper done.

Collaboration and Academic Honesty

This class will teach you about the way professional political scientists conduct research. An important component of any research project is academic integrity. Classroom exercises will sometimes involve group activities reflecting the collaborative nature of many research projects. However, you are expected to complete all graded assignments on your own, including examinations. While some amount of collaboration such as group practices outside class time (e.g., study groups) are allowed in that they allow you to master the skills discussed in class, plagiarism will not be tolerated in any form. I will respond to acts of academic misconduct according to university policy concerning plagiarism; sanctions for plagiarism can include a grade of F for the assignment in question and/or for the course and must include a report to the Dean of Students Office. In addition to the explicit rule against plagiarism, this class is governed by university regulations and expectations regarding academic affairs and academic integrity. If you are not familiar with these requirements, please review the [“Code of Student Rights, Responsibilities, and Conduct”](#).

Incomplete grades

Per University policies, and in the interest of fairness to all students in the course, students who do not complete course requirements will receive an F in this course. If you think you have a situation that warrants an incomplete grade, please seek the assistance of the **Student Advocates Office (SAO)** so you can then submit a written petition to us by November 16. In particular, please note that we will not consider requests to take an **I** grade if you realize late in the semester that you will be getting a low grade and want to retake the course in the future to get a higher grade. If you do have a different circumstance, your petition will be forwarded to the Department of Political Science for approval. If authorized by the Director of Undergraduate Studies, then we (staff and student) will need to prepare a written agreement that specifies the reason why exams or class work could not be completed on time, along with a completion timeline and an appropriate grade penalty. Please note that the College of Arts and Sciences has a final word on whether they accept our written agreement, so you should not expect automatic approval.

Cell Phones/Texting/Online Chats

Don't do it.

Important dates

To prevent any misunderstanding about deadlines, here is a summary of important dates in chronological order:

<u>Required task</u>	<u>Deadline</u>
Research question & Hypotheses	September 21 st
Literature Review	October 5 th
Midterm I	October 18 th
Research design	October 26 th
Midterm II	November 15 th
Final paper draft	November 25 th
Final research report	December 8 th

Course schedule

Part I: Fundamentals

We will spend the first weeks on the building blocks of institutional and governance analysis, introduction to concepts, and methods, as well as examples

Week 1 - 8/21-8/23 <u>Tuesday 21:</u> <u>Thursday 23:</u>	Introduction: Rational choice, collective action, and institutions Syllabus negotiation following Kaplan and Renard (2015) Institutions (North, 1991). The evolutionary basis of collective action (Bowles and Gintis, 2006). Governance: what do we know and how do we know it? (Fukuyama, 2016).
<u>Suggested reading:</u>	Investigating policy processes: the governance analytical framework (Hufty, 2011)
Week 2 - 8/28-8/30 <u>Tuesday 28:</u> <u>Thursday 30:</u> <u>Suggested readings:</u>	Methods: Game and formal theory; qualitative and quantitative methods No mandatory reading. Check suggested readings. No mandatory reading. Check suggested readings. Political Game Theory (Meirowitz and McCarthy, 2007 , ch.5), The question of status in Puerto Rico revisited (Marcano-Rivera, 2014), Understanding process tracing (Collier, 2011), How to read simple regression output , and The Basics of Multiple Regression .
Week 3 - 9/4-9/6 <u>Tuesday 4:</u> <u>Thursday 6:</u> <u>Suggested readings:</u>	Transaction costs, time-consistency, agency problems A transaction cost theory of politics (North, 1990). The political evolution of principal-agent models (Miller, 2005) Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules (Wyplosz, 2005). Political economics: explaining economic policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).

Part II: Political Institutions

These next few weeks will be centered on the analysis of political institutions and how they interact with the economy and society. From macroeconomic institutional complementarities, to laws, electoral systems, and government policies, this section applies the concepts we learned about earlier in the course, and explores an ever-changing political landscape, allowing students to formulate their own ideas on the analysis of the political world.

Week 4 - 9/11-9/13 <u>Tuesday 11:</u> <u>Thursday 13:</u>	Institutional coordination, complementarity, & change Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage (Soskice and Hall, 2001 , ch.1 Introduction) Varieties of capitalism: Trajectories of liberalization and the new politics of social solidarity (Thelen, 2012), Introduction: Institutional change in advanced political economies (Wolfgang and Thelen, 2005).
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Suggested reading: Institutional change in varieties of capitalism (Hall and Thelen, 2009), Varieties of capitalism (Hall, 2015).

Week 5 - **Constitutions, laws, and electoral systems - part 1**

9/18-9/20

Tuesday 18: Constitutions and economic policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2004), The economic effects of constitutions (Blume et al., 2009).

Thursday 20: Microfoundations of the Rule of Law (Hadfield and Weingast, 2014), Context, electoral rules, and party systems (Ferree, Powell and Scheiner, 2014),.

Friday 21 Research question & Hypotheses

Week 6 - **Constitutions, laws, and electoral systems - part 2**

9/25-9/27

Tuesday 25: Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies (Strøm, 2000), Modeling the institutional foundation of parliamentary government formation (Golder, Golder and Siegel, 2012).

Thursday 27: Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others (Iversen and Soskice, 2006), Electoral Laws, Parties, and Party Systems in Latin America (Morgenstern and Vázquez-DElía, 2007).

Suggested reading: Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons from Reforms of the 1990s (Scheiner, 2008), Perspectives on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Grofman, 2016).

Week 7 - **Partisanship, bureaucracies**

10/2-10/4

Tuesday 2: Partisanship, Political Polarization, and State Higher Education Budget Outcomes (Dar and Lee, 2014), The Economic Consequences of Partisanship in a Polarized Era (McConnell et al., 2018).

Thursday 4: The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization (Olsen, 2008).

Suggested reading: Bureaucracy and representative government (Niskanen, 2017)
Friday 5: Literature Review

Week 8 - **Monetary and financial policy, veto players**

10/9-10/11

Tuesday 2: The limits of delegation: Veto players, central bank independence, and the credibility of monetary policy (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003).

Thursday 4: The emerging global financial architecture: Tracing and evaluating the new patterns of the Trilemma's configurations ([Aizenman, Chinn and Ito, 2010](#)), International compliance with new Basel Accord principles for risk governance ([Wright, Sheedy and Magee, 2018](#)).

Suggested reading: Governance of international banking: The financial trilemma ([Schoenmaker, 2013](#)).

Week 9 - Midterm week

10/16-10/18

Tuesday 16: Review session

Thursday 18: **Midterm I**

Part III: Economic Institutions

The topics on this section revolve on the analysis of economic institutions, as well as economic outcomes of social and political constructions, and how these all interact with each other.

Week 10 - Property rights, public goods, tragedy of commons

10/23-10/25

Tuesday 23: Political regimes and economic growth ([Przeworski, Limongi and Giner, 1995](#)), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: historical lessons and emerging issues ([Chang, 2001](#)).

Thursday 25: Coping with the tragedy of the commons ([Ostrom, 1999](#)), Tragedy of the Commons ([Ostrom, 2008](#)).

Suggested reading: Public goods and ethnic divisions ([Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999](#)).

Friday 26 Research design

Week 11 - Collective bargaining, contract enforcement

10/30-11/1

Tuesday 30: Institutional dimensions of coordinating wage bargaining and monetary policy ([Franzese and Hall, 2000](#)).

Thursday 1: Contract enforcement, institutions, and social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised ([Edwards and Ogilvie, 2012](#)), .

Suggested reading: .

Week 12 - Inequality, economic cycles, international finance

11/6-11/8

Tuesday 6: Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men ([Rousseau, 1755](#))

ELECTION DAY

Thursday 8: Monetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leaders ([Clark, Golder and Poast, 2013](#)), Electoral Business Cycles in OECD Countries ([Canes-Wrone and Park, 2012](#)), The Governance of International Finance ([Frieden, 2016](#))..

Suggested reading: The Political Effects of Inequality in Latin America: Some Inconvenient Facts ([Kaufman, 2009](#)), Economic Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality ([Beramendi and Cusack, 2008](#)), The political economy of finance ([Pagano and Volpin, 2001](#)).

**Week 13 -
11/13-11/15** **Midterm Week**

Tuesday 13: Review session

Thursday 15: **Midterm II**

Part III: Whither we go?

The last portion of the class is invested in the current state of research, and in topics that weren't covered either in the political or economic institutional portions.

Week 14 THANKSGIVING BREAK

**Week 15 -
11/27-11/29** **Beyond markets and states, structural power**

Sunday 25 Final paper draft

Tuesday 27: Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems ([Ostrom, 2010](#))

Thursday 29: Structural power and public policy: A signaling model of business lobbying in democratic capitalism ([Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005](#)), Structural power and the global financial crisis: a network analytical approach ([Winecoff, 2015](#))

**Week 16 -
12/4-12/6** **Final thoughts and research paper**

Tuesday 4: Continuation of last week's readings, or other topics of interest that haven't been touched upon, will hand back paper drafts with comments by this date.

Thursday 6: No mandated readings, same as above, will be available for questions for the final paper.

Saturday 8 Final paper submission

References

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